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As the first part of the treatise on A General Theory of Concept Lattice (I∼V), this work
develops the general concept lattice for the problem concerning categorisation of objects according
to their properties. Unlike the conventional approaches, such as the formal concept lattice and the
rough set lattice, the general concept lattice is designed to adhere to the general principle that
the information content should be invariant regardless how the variables/parameters are presented.
Here, one will explicitly demonstrate the existence of such a construction by a sequence of fulfilments
compatible with the conventional lattice structure. The general concept lattice promises to be a
comprehensive categorisation for all the distinctive object classes according to whatever properties
they are equipped with. It will be shown that one can always regain the formal concept lattice and
rough set lattice from the general concept lattice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly accepted that the formal concept analysis (FCA) [1–3] and the rough set theory (RST) [4, 5] are
important approaches to the Big Data Analytics. One can superficially tell such importance from the rapid growth
of interest in both fields, e.g., the inclusion of the FCA and/or RST topics in many international conferences and
workshops. Although FCA and RST might have been motivated differently, it is believed that they are mutually
expressible [6–11]. Historically, the formal concept lattice (FCL) is a native part for FCA since FCA had its origin
in activities of restructuring mathematics, in particular, mathematics order and lattice theory [3]. On the other hand,
the rough set lattice (RSL) has also been accomplished [9, 10] in terms of the modal logic operators which cope with
RST in the binary version. Although the two concept lattices may be seen as dealing with different categorisations,
one may articulate them of the same object collection G and the same attribute setM related in a unique information
system, i.e. the same formal context. However, the systematic incorporation of the FCL and the RSL in the problem
analysis remains unobserved.
The treatise “A General Theory of Concept Lattice (I∼V)” is initiated by the general idea that the information con-
tent should be invariant regardless how the variables/parameters are presented. Notice the fact that the conventional
employment of objects and attributes are intuitively different. Unlike the objects, which are individuals, the attributes
as the object property description can overlap per conjunction. Thus, for general characterisation of logic problems it is
essential also to take into accout the composite attributes based on the operations {conjunction, disjunction, negation}.
There is no reason to stress the priority of the simple attributes in M over the composite attributes since one may
always rename the composite attributes into new simple (in contrast to composite) ones, which may render those
originally simple attributes composite. Instructed by such a principle, the general concept lattice (GCL) thus speaks
of the generalised attributes, which incorporate both the simple and the composite attributes constructable out of the
members of M .
In this part (I) the existence of GCL subject to the formal context will be demonstrated, giving rise to a more
informative structure than the conventional RSL and FCL. The GCL provides a comprehensive categorisation for
whatever objects discernible by the formal context since in its construction one can exhaust all the generalised
attributes, as will be clarified in the part (II) [13]. By contrast, the FCL is devised for those attributes given as
conjunctions of the members ofM and the RSL for those disjunctions. Remarkably, the comprehensive categorisation
in the GCL then brings about a simple framework for all the implications extractable from the lattice structure.
While these implications are considered between two generalised attributes, those implications deducible from the
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2FCL and RSL can be regained when one restricts oneself to the attributes of conjunction type and disjunction type,
respectively. The simple framework for all the implications enabled by the GCL in fact inspires the idea to represent
any implication relation by one single attribute, thereby rendering the primary deduction system (PDS), see the
part (III) [14], which is a simplified systems where logic statements only take into account the properties on a single
subject by means of predicates. The PDS is algebraically manipulable in the sense that the deductions are solely
Boolean algebras bypassing any of axioms. Note that being able to achieve an algebraically manipulable deduction is
rather practical. One may then manage to resolve any logic problem mindlessly if it could be arranged according to
the syntax of the algebraically manipulable deduction. Indeed, certain prevalent puzzles will be shown to be resolved
in the PDS in this manner. Another point is that tautology in effect occurs whenever the algebraically manipulable
deduction results in the Truth 1, which is essentially what all the axioms should end up. It can be shown that the
PDS adheres to the classical logic rules since the Hilbert axioms all turns out to be tautology when restricted to the
PDS.
In the parts (IV) and (V) of this treatise [15, 16], efforts are devoted to render the algebraically manipulable
deduction more realistic such that it can cope with the conventional reasoning. The following two points are of
concern.
• Dealing with pure attribute-typed logic statements in the PDS is na¨ıve since in reality every assertion, where
a property assignment has to be ascribed to a definite referential attribute set based on which a collection of
judgements altogether forms the statement.
• The PDS as concerned with the deduction on one sole subject (object class) cannot be sufficiently expressive
in formalising a general logic statement; one is looking forward to the further extensions.
For the first point, various attribute-type logic statements, though ascribed to different referential attribute sets, may
become the same one. In fact, such a problem reminds one about the conventional indifference of the set unions
Xc∪X = Y c∪Y = (Xc∩Y c)∪ (X ∩Y c)∪ (Xc∩Y )∪ (X ∩Y ) and so forth. Therefore, one argues [15] that the notion
of finite resolution enters the syntax of PDS and participates in the deduction as a novelty. The PDS incorporating
the finite resolution will then be referred to as the resolvable PDS, which however exhibits anomalies for some of
the Hilbert Axioms, entailing that the classical logic comprises certain counter-intuitiveness. As for the second point,
the secondary deduction system (2DS) [16] is designed to take into account those logic statements relating predicate
forms among different subjects. Note that, despite involving the PDS syntax as its particular statements, the 2DS
can be developed in parallel to the PDS. Thus, one does not anticipate different deduction rules from the 2DS than
from the PDS. Moreover, the resolvable 2DS can likewise arise from the reasoning incorporating finite resolution,
which can be traced back to the same origin that elicits the resolvable PDS.
To start with in this part (I), the GCL is a structure ordering lattice nodes marking the general concepts by means
of Galois connections. The general concept takes the 2-tuple representation (general extent, general intent), (Ge,Gi)
for short, which is similar to the formal concepts employed in FCL and in RSL. Below, one will demonstrate the
existence of such GCL through the accomplishment of the following goals.
G1 The general extent runs over all the distinctive object classes recognised by the formal context. The general intent
plays the role of properties of a definite object class and can be characterised by a pair of attributes referred to
as the generalised rough set property (Grsp) and the generalised formal concept property (Gfcp). The 2-tuples
(Ge, Grsp) and (Ge, Gfcp) in effect satisfy the generalisation of lattice conditions, respectively, employed for
the RSL [9, 10] and for the FCL [1–3].
G2 The GCL constitutes a Hasse diagram with a power set structure, where the nodes in the Hasse diagram can be
related by means of set inclusion relations among the object classes discernible by the formal context.
G3 Both RSL and FCL can be regained from the GCL as particular features.
G4 TheGCL allows for deterministic construction based on a particular collection of general concepts to be described
later.
G5 The GCL manifests a conjugate relation between its RSL- and FCL- counterparts and consequently emerges as
a self-dual lattice.
The formulation of the work at hand differs from the traditional approaches (typically, [1, 2, 9, 10]) mainly by the
employment of the generalised attributes. For concreteness, let M be the attribute set under consideration then the
GCL takes into account generalised attributes M∗ which are all the possible compositions of members from M by
means of all the basic Boolean operations. Thus, the information provided by the composite attributes M∗\M could
be as significant as the information given in terms of simple (in contrast to the composite ones) attributes M . In
3Sec. 2 some preliminaries of the RST and FCA are revisited, where one attempts an equal-footing treatment for
both theories based on their original conventions with minimal notation refinements. This is to establish a convenient
framework above which one may differentiate the GCL with the RSL and FCL. In Sec. 3, it is shown that both
the FCL- and RSL- intents could have been represented by single composite attributes without loss of generality.
Hence, the consideration to generalise the attribute domain from M to M∗ in the problem setting becomes intuitive.
Moreover, the sign of the GCL is revealed from some inconsistency observed in the conventional FCL and RSL
approach. In order to retain the consistency, one inevitably takes into account the full correspondence between
the objects and generalised attribute set M∗, which then gives rise to the GCL. It turns out that the GCL ends
up a comprehensive categorisation since its object classes range over all the possible object sets discernible by the
formal context. In addition, the nodes on the GCL can be ordered as general concepts. While each object class is
identified with a general extent, the corresponding general intent as its associate property may be acquired from the
generalisation of FCL-intent and RSL-intent. Although all the general intents can be directly determined per read
out from the formal context, as will be demonstrated in the next paper, one chooses here a constructive approach for
them by means of certain irreducibility conditions. It is through the design of such irreducibility conditions that one
can reveal how the traditional RSL and FCL being regained as part of GCL. In Sec. 4, results are summarised to
affirm the accomplishments of goals G1 to G5. There are also discussions concerning further developments for the
general theory of concept lattice.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND BENEATH
The formal context as stated in the FCA approach [3] is defined as a set structure K := (G,M, I), for which G
and M are sets while I is binary relation between G and M , i.e. I ⊆ G ×M ; the elements of G and M are called
(formal) objects and (formal) attributes, respectively, and gIm, i.e. (g,m) ∈ I, is read: the object g has the attribute
m. However, for the RST theorists there is a different convention, governing similar functions, where the information
system (IS) (U, V,R) [4] is often employed as a synonym of formal context. Hence, in order to prevent from confusion
caused by simultaneously treating both theories there is a compromise that preserves most of the original notations
employed in FCA and RST as follows.
Definition 2.1. A formal context is a set structure K := (G,M,R) (let it also be denoted by F (G,M)), for which G
and M are sets while R is binary relation between G and M , i.e. R ⊆ G ×M ; the elements of G and M are called
formal objects and formal attributes, respectively, and gRm, i.e. (g,m) ∈ R, is read: the object g has the attribute m.
Here, the notation F (G,M) is to emphasise that G and M are related, conceived through the formal context F ,
which is instructive whenever more than one formal contexts are simultaneously treated. In particular, the definition
given in Ref. [3] is modified into Definition 2.1 in the following manner.
• The original notation I used in FCA is reserved for the derivation operator, which is typically a map from
subset to subset. R is a binary operation which relates a single object (attribute) to an attribute-set (object-
set), denoted by gRm [1–3] where gR is an attribute-set and mR is an object-set.
– m ∈ gR (g ∈ G 7→ gR ⊆M): the object g has the attribute m,
– g ∈ mR (m ∈M 7→ mR ⊆ G): g is one of the objects that possess the attribute m.
Based on R, one may define all the derivation operators for both FCA and RST, i.e. I,  and ♦, as will be
clarified in Definition 2.2.
• The word formal is kept for the purpose to distinguish objects (G) and attributes (M), in contrast to the
traditional approaches where only set operations are employed for both objects and attributes.
– Members of G are to be treated formally like objects. In practice, there is a collection of individuals to
be categorized into classes. Thus, the operations for objects are those which are apt to manipulate set
relations, say intersection (∩), union (∪) and complementarity ({}c).
– Members of M are to be treated formally like attributes. It is natural to extend simple attributes into the
composite attributes by means of the Boolean operations. Here,
the product “·” (
∏
) is employed for the conjunction, i.e. the logical AND,
the summation “+” (
∑
) is employed for the disjunction, i.e. the logical OR,
the unary operation “¬” is employed for the negation, i.e. the logical NOT.
A brief summary in terms of the above new notation for the traditional approaches in FCA and RST is in order.
4Definition 2.2 ([1–3, 9, 10]). Given a formal context F (G,M), the derivation operators are
X ⊆ G 7→ XI = {m ∈M | gRm, ∀g ∈ X} ⊆M,
Y ⊆M 7→ Y I = {g ∈ G | gRm, ∀m ∈ Y } ⊆ G, (1)
X ⊆ G 7→ X = {m ∈M | ∀g ∈ G, gRm =⇒ g ∈ X} ⊆M,
Y ⊆M 7→ Y  = {g ∈ G | ∀m ∈M, gRm =⇒ m ∈M} ⊆ G, (2)
X ⊆ G 7→ X♦ = {m ∈M | ∃g ∈ G, (gRm, g ∈ X)} ⊆M,
Y ⊆M 7→ Y ♦ = {g ∈ G | ∃m ∈M, (gRm, m ∈M)} ⊆ G, (3)
where, notably, gRm is equivalently mRg since m ∈ gR iff g ∈ mR.
Subsequently, it is known that the maps in Eqs (1-3) manifest the following relations, for X,X1, X2 ⊆ G and
Xc := G\X ,
XIII = XI ,
X♦ = X
X♦♦ = X♦
, (4)
X1 ⊆ X2 ⇐⇒ (X2)
I ⊆ (X1)
I ,
X1 ⊆ X2 ⇐⇒ (X1) ⊆ (X2)
X1 ⊆ X2 ⇐⇒ (X1)♦ ⊆ (X2)♦
, (5)
Xcc = X♦, Xc♦c = X, (6)
where the same relations are also applied to Y, Y1, Y2 ⊆ M and Y c := M\Y . For convenience, let one employ the
notions extent and intent [1, 2] for both FCL and RSL such that the two theories can be handled on an equal footing.
Definition 2.3. Consider X ⊆ G and Y ⊆M subject to the formal context F (G,M).
• The 2-tuple (X,Y ) is called an FCL concept if XI = Y and Y I = X, where X is the FCL extent, Y is the FCL
intent [1, 2].
• The 2-tuple (X,Y ) is called an RSL concept if X = Y and Y ♦ = X, where X is the RSL extent, Y is the RSL
intent.
Notably, the 2-tuple (X,Y ) with
{
X=Y
Y ♦=X
has been referred to as object-oriented RSL concept [9, 10], in contrast
to the case of property-oriented concept defined through
{
X♦=Y
Y =X
. However, one will ignore the consideration of{
X♦=Y
Y =X
since it can be derived from
{
X=Y
Y ♦=X
by means of interchanging the object and attribute. In addition, as a
consequence of Eq. (6), {
X=Y
Y ♦=X
⇐⇒
{
Xccc=Y c
Y cc♦c=Xc
⇐⇒
{
(Xc)♦=(Y c)
(Y c)=(Xc)
, (7)
telling [10] that if (Xi, Yi) is a concept appropriate for
{
Xi =Yi
Y ♦i =Xi
then (Xci , Y
c
i ) is a concept appropriate for
{
Xi =Yi
Y ♦i =Xi
and vice versa. It is remarkable that Definition 2.3 provides fundamental ingredients for the original FCL and
RSL [2, 10]. Based on Eq. (4), a 2-tuple that fulfils
{
XI=Y
Y I=X
is guaranteed to exist and can be written as (XII , XI)
or (Y I , Y II), while a 2-tuple that fulfils
{
X=Y
Y ♦=X
is guaranteed to be existent and can be written as (X♦, X) or
(Y ♦, Y ♦). Moreover, the Galois connection composed by the two posets (2G,⊆) and (2M ,⊆) can be accomplished
in terms of the concepts by virtue of Eq. (5).
To proceed with the general theory of concept lattice, it is of crucial importance to clarify the notions contained in
formal objects and formal attributes. Since a formal context discerns the objects based on the attributes they possess,
the objects which possess the same attributes are grouped into an equivalent class.
Definition 2.4. The discernible object classes in the perspective of F (G,M) are definite. One will call these F -
distinct subsets of G and denote each such class with Dk in the sense that Dk’s are regarded as distinct entities by
F (G,M). The total number of these F -distinct object classes nF is less than or equal to |G|, which is the cardinality of
G. In effect, ∀g ∈ Dk gR = DIk, and D
I
k 6= D
I
k′ iff Dk 6= Dk′ . Hence, one has the collection of F -distinct object classes
G/R = {Dk | k = 1 . . . nF } based on the equivalence relation “g ≈R g
′ iff gR = g′R”, which means that {g, g′} ⊆ Dk
for some Dk ∈ G/R. Likewise, the F -codistinct subsets are gathered as G
/R = {G\Dk | Dk ∈ G/R}.
5In contrast to the formal objects, the formal attributes can also emerge in a composite manner. One is free to
construct various new attributes out of the given attributes by means of the standard Boolean operations, thereby
forming an extended framework for the general consideration.
Definition 2.5. Given a set M of attributes, the set of generalised attributes over M is defined as M∗ = {b(M0) |
M0 ⊆ M}, where b iterates over all the possibilities of Boolean functions in which the concerned operations are
“·” (conjunction), “+” (disjunction) and “¬” (negation). To be concrete, M∗ is meant to denote whatever one may
construct out of M by means of arbitrary compositions provided by the Boolean functions. In contrast to the members
of M∗, which may be composite, the attributes in M are then referred to as simple attributes.
Intuitively,M∗ also comprises the setM itself as well as the conventional truth 1 and falsity 0. Moreover, by means
of negation one may define several interesting subclasses of M∗.
Definition 2.6. Let M be certain collection of attributes of interest. A conjugate class ΨiM is referred to as one
of the 2|M| possibilities of {α | α = either a or ¬a, a ∈ M}. Accordingly, the set of all conjugate classes is denoted
with ΨM = {Ψ1M . . .Ψ
2|M|
M }. The symmetrised attribute set M˘ is employed to extend M by means of negation:
M˘ =M ∪ {¬a | a ∈M}.
One could also employ the set of generalised attributes asM∗ = (ΨiM )
∗ = {b(M0) |M0 ⊆ ΨiM} with any Ψ
i
M ∈ ΨM .
It is noteworthy that prescribing M∗, either by (ΨiM )
∗ or by Definition 2.5, may encounter abundant choices of
Boolean function b. Technically, such abundance can be reduced by means of normal forms, where one is in particular
interested in the conjunctive normal form (CNF) and the disjunctive normal form (DNF). The other choice to
suppress the redundance is to consider M∗ = (M˘)∗ = {b0(M0) |M0 ⊆ M˘}, where b0 differs from b by that no further
negation is needed (cf. Definition 2.5). In what follows, the particular significance of the generalised attributes over
M to the structure of F (G,M) will be presented step by step.
Attributes are considered to be further restrained through the attribute-object correspondence provided in the
formal context F (G,M).
Definition 2.7. According to Definition 2.5 any generalised attribute µ ∈ M∗ can be regarded as µ(M), namely
that µ is a (Boolean) function of M0, say µ = b(M0), for certain b and for some M0 ⊆ M . Subject to F (G,M), the
contextual (Boolean) function µF (M) for any generalised attribute µ ∈ M∗ is obtained from the expression of µ(M)
by (1) replacing the concerned attribute m with mR (mR ⊆ G), (2) replacing the concerned negative attribute ¬m with
(mR)c, (3) replacing the conjunction and disjunction operations with ∩ and ∪, respectively. Notably, the contextual
function µF (M) is essentially a subset of G.
For the extreme case, one has “m = m(M) ∀m ∈ M” such that mF (M) = mR ⊆ G ∀m ∈ M . The contextual
function can represent all the information contained in the formal context F (G,M) since the contextual function
assigns every attribute, say m, in M with a definite object subset which possesses m in common. Furthermore, such
idea can be extended.
Lemma 2.8. From F (G,M) one can deduce the extended formal context F ∗(G,M∗) without any additional assump-
tion in the sense that ∀µ ∈ M∗ µR can be determined by means of µR = µF (M), which is called “µ
R is well defined
in M∗”.
Proof. If µR is well defined inM∗ then one can achieve the extended formal context F ∗(G,M∗) such that each attribute
in M∗ is equipped with an object set which possess the attribute in common, similar to the case of F (G,M). Here,
the proof of “µR is well defined inM∗” can be carried out in two steps. It is to show that (1) ¬mR = (¬m)F ≡ (mR)c
(Definition 2.7) for m ∈M such that µR is well defined in M˘ and (2) both (
∏
µ µ)
R and (
∑
µ µ)
R are well defined
∀µ ∈ M˘ . Once these are done, one will end up with “µR is well defined in M∗” since M∗ can be obtained as M˘∗ by
means of “+” and “·” (see the discussion after Definition 2.6).
(1) For m ∈ M “g ∈ (¬m)R” can be interpreted as “g 6∈ mR”. In other words, g ∈ G\mR = (mR)c, hence,
(¬m)R = (mR)c = (¬m)F , which gives rise to mR = ((¬m)R)c after taking complementarity. Moreover, if the
negated attributes are also taken into account, the same interpretation implies that (¬¬m)R = ((¬m)R)c. This
is consistent since (¬¬m)R coincides with mR: gR(¬¬m) ⇐⇒ g 6∈ (¬m)R ⇐⇒ g ∈ ((¬m)R)c ⇐⇒ g ∈
((mR)c)c ⇐⇒ gRm.
(2) Since µR is well defined in M˘ , one may consider that (
∏
µ µ)
R = {g | gR(
∏
µ µ), g ∈ G} =
⋂
µ µ
R = (
∏
µ µ)F in
M˘ . Likewise, (
∑
µ µ)
R = {g | gR(
∑
µ µ), g ∈ G} =
⋃
µ µ
R = (
∑
µ µ)F ∀µ ∈ M˘ .
6Definition 2.9. A contextual Venn diagram (or Euler diagram) VFM subject to F (G,M) can illustrate the set relations
among the contextual functions of attributes in M . One can achieve VFM by encircling the object-set m
R within the
object collection G, where the object-labellings are ignored. In contrast, M may also have its own intrinsic logical
structure in terms of the (conventional) Venn digram VM .
In practice, there are two types of ordering systems for attributes. As the first type, “≥,≤” is concerned with the
intrinsic ordering of the entities in M∗. For instance, µi ≤ µj denotes that the region representing µi are included
in the region representing µj on VM . The second type of ordering system “⊇,⊆” is employed for VFM because µ
Rs
are in fact object sets. Notably, preserving the object labellings in the contextual Venn digram will restore all the
information content of the formal context. The contextual Venn diagram with explicit object labellings turns out to
be an alternative representation for the formal context. Once VFM is given, Lemma 2.8 becomes a rather intuitive
result since one may read off every µR for µ ∈M∗. The other point is that the formal context does not per se suggest
any intrinsic relation among members in M . Attributes in M can be basically independent, hence, any two attributes
have an intersection on the corresponding Venn diagram (VM = V0M ). However, it is also allowable that one imposes
additional constraints on M by removing some of the disjoint regions from V0M .
Lemma 2.10. Subject to the formal context F (G,M), ∀µ∀µi∀µj ∈M∗,
• µR 6= ∅ =⇒ µ 6= 0,
• µi = µj =⇒ µRi = µ
R
j but µ
R
i 6= µ
R
j =⇒ µi 6= µj,
• µi < µj =⇒ µRi ⊆ µ
R
j but µ
R
i ⊂ µ
R
j =⇒ µi 6> µj.
Proof. • If µ = 0 but µR = X 6= ∅ then the existence of the object set X is contradictory.
• µi = µj =⇒ µRi = µ
R
j since from µi(M) = µj(M) it follows that (µi)F (M) = (µj)F (M) (Lemma 2.8). If
µRi 6= µ
R
j then µ
Rc
i ∩ µ
R
j 6= ∅ and/or µ
R
i ∩ µ
Rc
j 6= ∅ which means that (¬µi · µj)
R 6= ∅ and/or (µi · ¬µj)R 6= ∅.
Consequently, (¬µi · µj) 6= 0 and/or (µi · ¬µj) 6= 0, which contradicts µi = µj .
• For µi < µj one may assume µj = µi+β in which β ∈M∗. Then, µRj = µ
R
i ∪β
R ⊇ µRi according to Lemma 2.8.
Moreover, if µRi ⊂ µ
R
j but µi > µj , contraction occurs since µi > µj implies µ
R
i ⊇ µ
R
j which denies µ
R
i ⊂ µ
R
j .
Thus, µRi ⊂ µ
R
j =⇒ µi 6> µj .
The above shows that the distinction between µi and µj is stronger than the pair (µ
R
i , µ
R
j ). More concretely, the
number of disjoint regions on V0M is 2
|M|, since VFM is less discernible than V
0
M , thus 2
|M| ≥ nF [17].
Definition 2.11. The contextual equivalent class of attribute subject to F (G,M) is an attribute-set defined in the
following manner. Given ν ∈ M∗, one may collect all the attributes which have the same contextual function (Def-
inition 2.7) with ν as {ν}F = {µ | µR = νR, µ ∈ M∗}. Accordingly, since νR ⊆ G, the idea can be employed with
respect to definite object-set in the sense that [X ]F = {µ | µR = X, µ ∈M∗} for X ⊆ G.
It is noteworthy that the construction (X, [X ]F ) is in fact the precursor of the concept on the GCL. Here, the
remaining condition lies on determining whether an arbitrary subset of G can form a node of the GCL. Remarkably,
a subset X of G with trivial contextual equivalent class, i.e. [X ]F = ∅, can hardly participate in the categorization
provided by the formal context since no attribute can be found to label it. The point is that any of the F -distinct
subsets of G (Definition 2.7), say Dk, is readily a smallest possible subset equipped with non-trivial contextual
equivalent attributes. In other words, the F -distinct subsets correspond to the smallest regions on the contextual
Venn diagram (Definition 2.9), hence, there exists no attribute, say µ, whose contextual function µR exactly encloses
a region which is smaller than the region marked by Dk. Consequently, for X that can be written as the union of
F -distinct subsets (X =
⋃
kX
DkX ) one has non-trivial [X ]F , otherwise [X ]F = ∅.
A further instructive notion is the smallest yet non-trivial constituents of the generalised attribute set, for which
one may develop two independent non-trivial minimisation aspects. Firstly, one may speak of the minimal attributes
of M∗ which are not the Falsity 0 and thus correspond to the smallest regions on the Venn diagram VM . Secondly,
subject to F (G,M), there are classes of irreducible attributes that determines the object classes which participate in
the categorisation in a least possible manner. Here, the first non-trivial minimisation aspect is a prevalent issue which
deserves clarification.
Lemma 2.12. Given an attribute-setM , one may define the set of non-trivial infima binf (M
∗) := {τ ∈M∗ | τ ≻M 0}
and the set of non-trivial suprema bsup(M
∗) := {τ ∈ M∗ | 1 ≻M τ} for the corresponding generalised attribute-set
M∗. In the case of µ ≻M ν, one denotes that µ > ν without any attribute χ ∈ M
∗ which fulfils µ > χ > ν. Both
binf (M
∗) and bsup(M
∗) can be expressed in terms of ΨM (Definition 2.6):
7• binf (M∗) =
{∏
ΨjM | Ψ
j
M ∈ ΨM
}
,
∏
ΨjM is called M
∗-atom, which is considered as an atom for M∗.
• bsup(M
∗) =
{∑
ΨjM | Ψ
j
M ∈ ΨM
}
,
∑
ΨjA is called M
∗-coatom.
Proof. One may rewrite τ ≻M 0 as “τ · β ∈ {τ,0} ∀β ∈M
∗”.
• For any β ∈ M∗ one may write down the DNF as β =
∑
iβ
∏
Ψ
iβ
M , where the range of iβ is up to the given β.
Hence, ∀j∀β β ·
∏
ΨjM =
(∑
iβ
∏
Ψ
iβ
M
)
·
∏
ΨjM ∈
{∏
ΨjM ,0
}
, ∴ ∀j
∏
ΨjM ∈ binf (M
∗). On the other hand,
assume ∃χ ∈ binf (M∗) but χ 6=
∏
ΨjM for Ψ
j
M ∈ ΨM . However, attribute χ may take the form
∑
iχ
∏
Ψ
iχ
M in
DNF, which apparently implies χ 6≻M 0. One concludes then binf (M∗) =
{∏
ΨjM | Ψ
j
M ∈ ΨM
}
.
• β+
∑
ΨjM ≡ β ·¬(
∑
ΨjM )+
∑
ΨjM ∀j∀β. Subsequently, β ·¬(
∑
ΨjM ) ∈
{
¬(
∑
ΨjM ),0
}
based on the above result
since ¬(
∑
ΨjM ) can be identified as
∏
Ψj
′
M for some Ψ
j′
M ∈ ΨM , which implies that β +
∑
ΨjM ∈
{
1,
∑
ΨjM
}
,
i.e.
∑
ΨjM ∈ bsup(M
∗). On the other hand, assume ∃χ ∈ bsup(M∗) but χ 6=
∑
ΨjM for Ψ
j
M ∈ ΨM . However,
attribute χ may take the form
∏
iχ
∑
Ψ
iχ
M in CNF, which apparently implies χ 6≺M 1. Therefore, bsup(M
∗) ={∑
ΨjM | Ψ
j
M ∈ ΨM
}
.
Corollary 2.13. Whenever there are no intrinsic conditions pre-imposed on the attributes in M , the cardinalities
are as follows.
• The numbers of non-trivial suprema and infima for M∗ are equivalent: |bsup(M∗)| = |binf (M∗)| = 2|M|.
• There are 22
|M|
distinct generalised attributes in M∗, i.e., |M∗| = 22
|M|
.
Proof. Whenever there are no intrinsic conditions pre-imposed on the attributes in M , the elements of binf (M
∗) can
be represented by the 2|M| disjoint regions on V0M .
• Alternatively, by Definition 2.6 one may compute that |binf (M∗)| = |ΨM | = 2|M|. The elements of bsup(M∗)
amount to the complementary parts of the disjoint regions on V0M , which demonstrates an one-to-one correspon-
dence; |bsup(M∗)| = |binf (M∗)|.
• Denote the members in binf (M∗) with bk where 1 ≤ k ≤ 2|M|. An attribute in M∗, say µ, can take the
expression
∑
kµ
bkµ in DNF. In other words, the attributes inM
∗ may be implemented by
∑
k∈M1
bk whereM1
ranges over all the possibilities for M1 ⊆ binf (M∗). Counting all these possibilities is equivalent to enumerating
the number of the power sets of a set with 2|M| members, i.e., |M∗| = 22
|M|
.
The second non-trivial minimisation aspect mentioned above is related to the formal context.
Definition 2.14. A generalised attribute µ ∈F+ M∗ composed of the disjunction of attributes in M˘ (Definition 2.6)
is called an irreducible disjunction subject to F (G,M) if eliminating any term in the disjunction from µ, which results
in µ′, always causes (µ′)R ⊂ µR. Accordingly, an X-irreducible disjunction class can be defined as [X+]F = {µ ∈
[X ]F | µ ∈F+ M∗}, see Definition 2.11. On the other hand, a generalised attribute µ ∈F× M∗ composed of the
conjunction of attributes in M˘ is called an irreducible conjunction in M∗ subject to F (G,M) if eliminating any term
in the conjunction from µ, which results in µ′, always causes (µ′)R ⊃ µR. The X-irreducible conjunction class is
given as [X×]F := {µ ∈ [X ]F | µ ∈F× M∗}.
In practice, µ ∈F+ M∗ can be written in terms of µ =
∑
α∈ψ α for some ψ ⊆ Ψ
j
M (Definition 2.6) in which
µR 6=
(∑
α∈ψ\{α0}
α
)R
∀α0 ∈ ψ. Likewise, µ ∈F× M∗ can be written in terms of µ =
∏
α∈ψ α for some ψ ⊆ Ψ
j
M
8where µR 6=
(∏
α∈ψ\{α0}
α
)R
∀α0 ∈ ψ. Generally speaking, [X
+]F ∪ [X
×]F ⊆ [X ]F and [X
+]F ∩ [X
×]F 6= ∅. The
other useful expressions are
[X×0 ]F
[X×i ]F
:=
{
µ ∈ [X×0 ]F | µ 6= ν1 · ν2, ν1 ∈ [X
×
i ]F or ν2 ∈ [X
×
i ]F
}
⊆ [X×0 ]F ,
[X+0 ]F
[X+j ]F
:=
{
µ′ ∈ [X+0 ]F | µ
′ 6= ν′1 + ν
′
2, ν
′
1 ∈ [X
+
j ]F or ν
′
2 ∈ [X
+
j ]F
}
⊆ [X+0 ]F . (8)
Note that
[X×
0
]F
[X×i ]F
6= [X×0 ]F only when Xi ⊃ X0 and
[X+
0
]F
[X+j ]F
6= [X+0 ]F only when Xj ⊂ X0. What follows is mainly
concerned with regaining the FCL and RSL nodes on the GCL.
Lemma 2.15. • ∀m˘ ∈ M˘ m˘ ∈ [(m˘R)+]F∩[(m˘R)×]F and, furthermore, ∀Xi∀Xj 6= m˘R m˘ ∈
[(m˘R)+]F
[X+i ]F
∩ [(m˘
R)×]F
[X×j ]F
.
• ∀µ ∈M∗ µ ∈ [X+]F =⇒ ¬µ ∈ [(Xc)
×
]F and µ ∈ [X×]F =⇒ ¬µ ∈ [(Xc)
+
]F .
Proof. • Any attribute m˘ ∈ M˘ (Definition 2.6) is non-composite and can be thus regarded as both an one-term
disjunction and an one-term conjunction. Therefore, m˘ is simultaneously an m˘R-irreducible disjunction and an
m˘R-irreducible conjunction. Moreover, m˘ 6= ν1 · ν2 in which ν1 ∈ [X
×
i ]F or ν2 ∈ [X
×
i ]F and m˘ 6= ν
′
1 + ν
′
2 in
which ν′1 ∈ [X
+
j ]F or ν
′
2 ∈ [X
+
j ]F .
• For µ ∈ [X+]F , let µ =
∑
α∈ψ α where ψ ⊆ Ψ
j
M for some Ψ
j
M ∈ ΨM . Accordingly, µ
R = X but ∀α1 ∈ ψ(∑
α∈ψ\{α1}
α
)R
6= X , which implies that (¬µ)R = Xc but ∀α1 ∈ ψ
(∑
α∈ψ\{α1}
α
)Rc
6= Xc. It then turns
out that
(¬µ)R =

∏
α∈ψ
¬α


R
=

∏
α∈ψ′
α


R
= Xc but ∀¬α1 ∈ ψ
′

 ∏
α∈ψ′\{¬α1}
α


R
6= Xc,
where ψ′ = {¬α | α ∈ ψ} ⊆ Ψj
′
M with Ψ
j′
M = {¬α | α ∈ Ψ
j
M} ∈ ΨM . Therefore, µ ∈ [X
+]F =⇒ ¬µ ∈ [(Xc)
×
]F .
Similarly, starting with µ′ =
∑
α∈ψ α ∈ [X
×]F , one will end up with µ
′ ∈ [X×]F =⇒ ¬µ′ ∈ [(Xc)
+]F .
3. OBTAINING THE GENERAL CONCEPT LATTICE
The general theory of concept lattice is capable of providing the categorisation for the formal objects G according
to members of M∗. First of all, one observes that one could have replaced both FCL and RSL intents in the original
constructions in terms of single composite attributes without altering their information contents.
Lemma 3.1. Let X ⊆ G, Y ⊆M for the formal context F (G,M). The concepts for FCL and RSL (Definition 2.3)
can be both expressed in terms of (X,µ) in the following manner.
• For FCL, use µ =
∏
Y , where µ is referred to as a formal concept property (fcp). Imposing
{
XI=Y
Y I=X
on (X,Y )
is indistinguishable from imposing
{∏
XI=µ
µR=X
on (X,µ).
• For RSL, use µ =
∑
Y , where µ is referred to as a rough set property (rsp). Imposing
{
X=Y
Y ♦=X
on (X,Y ) is
indistinguishable from imposing
{∑
X=µ
µR=X
on (X,µ).
Proof. • XI = Y =⇒
∏
XI =
∏
Y . Reversely, since both XI and Y consist of distinct members in M ,
∏
XI =∏
Y =⇒ XI = Y . Thus, XI = Y ⇐⇒
∏
XI =
∏
Y and it is appropriate to employ µ =
∏
Y . Moreover, by
Eq. (1) µR = (
∏
Y )R =
⋂
y∈Y y
R = {g ∈ G | gRy, ∀y ∈ Y } = Y I . Consequently, µR = X ⇐⇒ Y I = X .
9• X = Y =⇒
∑
X =
∑
Y . Reversely, since both X and Y consist of distinct members in M ,
∑
X =∑
Y =⇒ X = Y . Thus, X = Y ⇐⇒
∑
X =
∑
Y and it is appropriate to employ µ =
∑
Y . Moreover,
by Eq. (2) and (3) µR = (
∑
Y )R =
⋃
y∈Y y
R = {g ∈ G | ∃y ∈ M, (gRy, y ∈ Y )} = Y ♦. Consequently,
µR = X ⇐⇒ Y ♦ = X .
Since the above proof has invoked some of variants of derivation operators (see Eq. (1)-(3)), it is worthwhile to
mention about all of such variants:
XI = {m ∈M | gRm, ∀g ∈ X} ≡
{
m ∈M | mR ⊇ X
}
=
⋂
x∈X
xR,
X = {m ∈M | ∀g ∈ G, gRm =⇒ g ∈ X} ≡
{
m ∈M | mR ⊆ X
}
,
X♦ = {m ∈M | ∃g ∈ G, (gRm, g ∈ X)} ≡
⋃
x∈X
xR, (9)
where it is intuitive that interchanging the role of X and Y also gives rise to the other set of derivation operators.
Another point is that there are particular object-classes which are fundamental in both the FCL and the RSL.
Proposition 3.2. Given a formal context F (G,M), ∀m ∈ M the object-set mR is a common extent for FCL and
RSL.
Proof. (mR, (mR)I) coincides with (Y I , Y II) and (mR, (mR)) coincides with (Y ♦, Y ♦), where in both cases Y is
identified as {m}.
Note that the result of Proposition 3.2 is rather intriguing, albeit true. Since the formal context conventionally
develops a table, Proposition 3.2 in fact entails that the object-classmR is recognised as an extent for both the FCL
and RSL just because m is listed in the table. Now, assume that there is a formal concept (X1, Y1) for FCL subject
to F (G,M). Then, by virtue of Proposition 3.1 one has µR1 = X1 with µ1 =
∏
Y1. Consider F
′(G,M ∪ {µ1})
which is obtained by explicitly including the given (X1, µ1) correspondence as an additional column in F (G,M). By
Lemma 2.8 µR1 = X1 is something deducible from F (G,M), thus, F
′(G,M ∪ {µ1}) should not provide different
concept lattices. However, µ1 is now listed in the new table F
′(G,M ∪ {µ1}), which implies that X1 must also be an
RSL-extent when it is known to be an FCL extent. This is denied by the original FCL and RSL (see the comparison in
Ref. [10]), therefore, it is unnatural to neglect the role the composite attribute may play just because it is not simple
(Definition 2.5). Hereafter, the general theory of concept lattice will proceed in a different way from the original
ones by attempting a democratic consideration for all the members in M∗.
The concept lattice subject to F (G,M) inevitably makes reference on its accompanied extended formal context,
i.e. F ∗(G,M∗). Since µR is well defined ∀µ ∈ M∗ (Lemma 2.8), it is straightforward to manipulate F ∗(G,M∗) in
parallel to the conventional formal context.
Definition 3.3. Following from Definition 2.2, the derivation operators appropriate for F ∗(G,M∗) are given as
X ⊆ G 7→ XI
∗
= {µ ∈M∗ | gRµ, g ∈ X} ⊆M∗,
Y ⊆M∗ 7→ Y I
∗
= {g ∈ G | gRµ, ∀m ∈ Y } ⊆ G,
X ⊆ G 7→ X
∗
= {µ ∈M∗ | ∀g ∈ G, gRµ =⇒ g ∈ X} ⊆M∗,
Y ⊆M∗ 7→ Y 
∗
= {g ∈ G | ∀m ∈M∗, gRµ =⇒ µ ∈M∗} ⊆ G,
X ⊆ G 7→ X♦
∗
= {µ ∈M∗ | ∃g ∈ G, (gRµ, g ∈ X)} ⊆M∗,
Y ⊆M∗ 7→ Y ♦
∗
= {g ∈ G | ∃µ ∈M∗, (gRµ, µ ∈M∗)} ⊆ G.
Obviously, Eq. (4) to (6) remain valid after the substitutions “I by I∗,  by ∗, ♦ by ♦∗”.
Proposition 3.4. Subject to F ∗(G,M∗), the general concept (X, ρ(X), η(X)) can be obtained as a generalisation of
the original FCL and RSL concepts (Lemma 3.1) as follows. If ρ(X) =
∑
X
∗
, η(X) =
∏
XI
∗
and (ρ(X))R =
(η(X))R = X then X is called the general extent, where the allowable general extents are collected as EF := {X ⊂
G | [X ]F 6= ∅} =
{
µR | µ ∈M∗
}
. In addition, ρ(X) is the generalised rough set property (Grsp) and η(X) is the
generalised formal concept property (Gfcp).
Proof. The general concept here is the consequence of applying Proposition 3.2 to F ∗(G,M∗), which is telling that
∀µ ∈ M∗ µR is a common extent of FCL and RSL in the perspective of F ∗(G,M∗). In practice, (X, ρ(X), η(X))
represents the dual use of (X,µ) in Proposition 3.1 generalised in the sense of Definition 3.3. Accordingly,{
(X,ρ(X))=(X,
∑
X
∗
)
(X,η(X))=(X,
∏
XI
∗
)
as well as (ρ(X))R = X = (η(X))R.
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The general extent can X then take the form of µR with µ = ρ(X) or µ = η(X), thereby being referred to as an
object class with non-trivial contextual equivalent attributes (Definition 2.11).
Proposition 3.5. Let EF = {X ⊂ G | [X ]F 6= ∅} ≡
{
µR | µ ∈M∗
}
denote the collection of all the object classes
with non-trivial contextual equivalent classes of attributes.
• The set EF is the sigma algebra σ(
{
mR | m ∈M
}
).
• EF = σ(G/R) =
{⋃
D∈E0 D | E
0 ⊆ G/R
}
is only concerned with unions of the members in G/R and |EF | = 2
nF .
• Given {X1, X2. . . .} ⊆ EF then σ({X1, X2. . . .}) ⊆ EF .
Proof. The significance of the sigma algebra generated by a collection of sets is that it exhausts whatever constructable
out of the collection by means of iterating various steps of set operations such as intersection, union and complemen-
tarity. The sigma algebra is essentially closed under intersection, union and complementarity.
• EF = {µR | µ ∈M∗} (Proposition 3.4), where µR = µF ∀µ ∈M∗ is well defined according to Lemma 2.8.
Hence, EF can be obtained from
{
mR | m ∈M
}
by means of intersection, union and complementarity (Defi-
nition 2.7). Moreover, upon representing the member of EF as µ
R
i for some µi ∈M
∗, the closure relations are
as follows.
µR1 ∩ µ
R
2 = (µ1 · µ2)
R ∈ EF since µ1 · µ2 ∈M∗,
µR1 ∪ µ
R
2 = (µ1 + µ2)
R ∈ EF since µ1 + µ2 ∈M∗,
(µR3 )
c = (¬µ3)R ∈ EF since ¬µ3 ∈M∗.
Therefore, EF is closed under intersection, union and complementarity.
• Firstly, EF ⊇ G/R in that ∀Dk ∈ G/R ∃µk s.t. µ
R
k = Dk. For instance, µ
R
k = Dk is satisfied by taking
µk =
∏{
m | m ∈ DIk ⊆M
}
·
∏{
¬m | m ∈M\DIk
}
. Moreover, EF ⊇ σ(G/R) due to the fact that EF is itself
a sigma algebra. On the other hand, σ(G/R) ⊇
{
mR | m ∈M
}
since, e.g., X0 := m
R can be expressed in
terms of
⋃
kX0
DkX0 . Likewise, σ(G/R) ⊇ σ(
{
mR | m ∈M
}
) = EF since σ(G/R) is a sigma algebra. Therefore,
EF = σ(G/R). Secondly, σ(G/R) =
{⋃
D∈E0 D | E
0 ⊆ G/R
}
because G/R only comprises the disjoint members
“D1, D2 . . . , DnF ” where
⋃nF
k=1Dk = G. Accordingly, one obtains that |EF | = |σ(G/R)| = 2
nF .
• σ({X1, X2. . . .}) is the smallest collection that is closed under intersection, union and complementarity and
contains {X1, X2. . . .}, therefore, {X1, X2. . . .} ⊆ σ({X1, X2. . . .}) ⊆ EF because EF is a sigma algebra.
Proposition 3.6. The requirement for the general concept (X, ρ(X), η(X)) in Proposition 3.4 is satisfied if X ∈ EF .
EF is in effect the full collection of general extents for the GCL.
• ∀X ∈ EF , ρ(X) =
∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
[X0]F ) and η(X) =
∏
X0⊇X
(
∏
[X0]F ) where in both cases X0 ∈ EF .
• Equivalently, ρ(X) =
∑
[X ]F and η(X) =
∏
[X ]F .
Proof. It is remarkable for any subset O ⊆ G that O ∈ EF implies [O]F 6= ∅ otherwise [O]F = ∅. In what follows, X
is reserved for the use of X ∈ EF such that
∑
[X ]F and
∏
[X ]F can be defined.
• According to Definition 3.3,
ρ(X) =
∑
X
∗
=
∑
{µ ∈M∗ | ∀g ∈ G, gRµ =⇒ g ∈ X} =
∑(⋃
O⊆X [O]F
)
=
∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
[X0]F ),
∴ ρ(X)R =
(∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
[X0]F )
)R
=
⋃
X0⊆X
(
⋃
µ∈[X0]F
µR) = X , which satisfies Proposition 3.4,
η(X) =
∏
XI
∗
=
∏
{µ ∈M∗ | gRµ, g ∈ X} =
∏(⋃
O⊇X [O]F
)
=
∏
X0⊇X
(
∏
[X0]F ),
∴ η(X)R =
(∏
X0⊇X
(
∏
[X0]F )
)R
=
⋂
X0⊇X
(
⋂
µ∈[X0]F
µR) = X , ditto.
• If µ ∈ [X ]F then µ+
∑
X0⊂X
[X0]F ∈ [X ]F as well as µ ·
∏
X0⊃X
[X0]F ∈ [X ]F .
Therefore,
∑
[X ]F =
∑
µ∈[X]F
µ =
∑
µ∈[X]F
(
µ+
∑
X0⊂X
[X0]F
)
=
∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
[X0]F )
and
∏
[X ]F =
∏
µ∈[X]F
µ =
∏
µ∈[X]F
(
µ ·
∏
X0⊃X
[X0]F
)
=
∏
X0⊇X
(
∏
[X0]F ).
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The GCL then comprises 2nF nodes which correspond to 2nF general concepts (Proposition 3.5). Specifically,
there is no more need to search for the object classes that satisfy the requirements for general concepts. The general
extents are nothing but the object classes equipped with non-trivial contextual equivalent classes of attributes. The
GCL thus provides a categorisation for whatever object sets that can be explicitly labelled by attributes. Subsequently,
the following conjugate relation considerably reduces the complexity for deducing GCL.
Proposition 3.7. (X, ρ(X), η(X)) is a general concept if only if (Xc, ρ(Xc), η(Xc)) is a general concept,
where ρ(Xc) = ¬η(X) and η(Xc) = ¬ρ(X).
Proof. Since EF is a sigma algebra by Proposition 3.5, X ∈ EF ⇐⇒ Xc ∈ EF . Moreover, with Proposition 3.6,
¬ρ(X) = ¬
∑
[X ]F =
∏
{µ | ¬µ ∈ [X ]F } =
∏
{µ | µ ∈ [Xc]F } =
∏
[Xc]F = η(X
c). Likewise,
¬η(X) = ¬
∏
[X ]F =
∑
[Xc]F = ρ(X
c).
Interestingly, although the above result has a similar appearance to Eq. (7), it possesses a completely different
meaning. The GCL is self-dual in the sense that the general concepts always appear pairwise. Subsequently, in order
to furnish the lattice structure, the way to order concepts as nodes on the lattice remains in question. We now proceed
to resolve the question.
Proposition 3.8. Given a formal context F (G,M), ∀X ∈ EF
• if X 6∈ G/R and X 6= ∅, ρ(X) =
∑
X0⊂X
ρ(X0),
• if X 6∈ G/R and X 6= G, η(X) =
∏
X0⊃X
η(X0).
Proof. • ρ(X) =
∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
[X0]F ) =
∑
[X ]F +
∑
X0⊂X
(
∑
[X0]F ) = ρ(X)+
∑
X0⊂X
ρ(X0) by Proposition 3.6,
hence, ρ(X) ≥
∑
X0⊂X
ρ(X0). In addition, if one can prove that
∑
X0⊂X
ρ(X0) ≥ ρ(X) then the statement
is established. Since X 6∈ G/R ∪ {∅}, there exists some subset X1 ⊂ X s.t. X\X1 6= ∅ and X1 ∈ EF .
Consider then
∑
X0⊂X
ρ(X0) =
∑
X0⊂X
∑
[X0]F =
∑(⋃
X0⊂X
[X0]F
)
. Clearly, for any τ1 ∈ [X1]F one has
ρ(X) · τ1 ∈ [X1]F ⊆
⋃
X0⊂X
[X0]F because (ρ(X) · τ1)R = ρ(X)R ∩ τR1 = X1. Moreover, (ρ(X) · ¬τ1)
R =
ρ(X)R ∩ τRc1 = X\X1, which implies that ρ(X) · ¬τ1 ∈ [X\X1]F ⊆
⋃
X0⊂X
[X0]F , where notably [X\X1]F 6= ∅
for [X1]F 6= ∅ (Proposition 3.5). Consequently,
⋃
X0⊂X
[X0]F ⊇ {ρ(X) · τ1, ρ(X) · ¬τ1}, which implies that∑
X0⊂X
ρ(X0) ≡
∑(⋃
X0⊂X
[X0]F
)
≥ (ρ(X) · τ) + (ρ(X) · ¬τ ) ≡ ρ(X).
• The above result implies that ¬ρ(X) = ¬
∑
X0⊂X
ρ(X0) =
∏
X0⊂X
¬ρ(X0) for X ∈ EF \G/R\ {∅}. Then, by
Lemma 3.7, η(Xc) =
∏
X0⊂X
η(Xc0) for X ∈ EF \G/R\ {∅} which is equivalent to η(X) =
∏
X0⊃X
η(X0) for
X ∈ EF \G/R\ {G}.
All the general concepts, i.e. (X, ρ(X), η(X)) ∀X ∈ EF , can be deduced in a definite manner based on a few
fundamental attributes.
Proposition 3.9. Subject to the formal context F (G,M) ∀X ∈ EF
• if X 6= ∅ then ρ(X) =
∑
k∈K ρ(Dk) for some K ⊆ {1, . . . nF },
• if X 6= G then η(X) =
∏
k 6∈K η(D
c
k) for some K ⊆ {1, . . . nF }, where D
c
k ≡ G\Dk.
Proof. Since X ∈ EF , Proposition 3.5 entails that X =
⋃
k∈K Dk =
⋂
k 6∈K D
c
k for some K ⊆ {1, . . . nF }.
• If X 6∈ G/R then ρ(X) =
∑
X0⊂
⋃
k∈K Dk
ρ(X0) =
∑
k∈K ρ(Dk) (Definition 2.4, Lemma 3.8). Meanwhile,
X ∈ G/R entails that X = Dk and ρ(X) ≡ ρ(Dk) for some k ∈ {1, . . . nF }.
• If X 6∈ G/R then η(X) =
∏
X0⊃
⋂
k 6∈K D
c
k
η(X0) =
∏
k 6∈K η(D
c
k). Meanwhile, X ∈ G
/R entails that X = Dck and
η(X) ≡ η(Dck) for some k ∈ {1, . . . nF }.
Thus, once Pρ := {ρ(∅)} ∪ {ρ(Dk) | 1 ≤ k ≤ nF } or Pη := {η(G)} ∪ {η(Dck) | 1 ≤ k ≤ nF } is obtained, Proposi-
tion 3.9 in practice ensures that the full Grsp’s and Gfcp’s can be unambiguously determined. However, the other
instructive issue is that certain particular attributes can be determined without Pρ or Pη.
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Proposition 3.10. Given a formal context F (G,M), η(Dk) is anM
∗-atom and ρ(Dck) anM
∗-coatom (Lemma 2.12)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ nF . It can be identified that η(Dk) =
∏
Ψk and ρ(Dck) =
∑
(M˘\Ψk) with ΨM = {m ∈ M | m ∈
DIk} ∪ {¬m | m 6∈ D
I
k,m ∈M}, where Ψ
k ∈ ΨM (Definition 2.6).
Proof. Since gR = DIk ∀g ∈ Dk, if Ψ
k = {m ∈ M | m ∈ DIk} ∪ {¬m | m 6∈ D
I
k,m ∈ M} then (
∏
Ψk)R = Dk.
It turns out that (
∏
Ψk) ∈ [Dk]F , and η(Dk) =
∏
[Dk]F ≤
∏
Ψk. Meanwhile,
∏
Ψk ≻M 0 by Lemma 2.12,
telling that ∀µ ∈ M∗ µ 6<
∏
Ψk unless µ = 0. Note that η(Dk) 6= 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ nF since 0
R is the empty
object set ∅. Therefore, η(Dk) =
∏
Ψk, where Ψk = {m ∈ M | m ∈ DIk} ∪ {¬m | m 6∈ D
I
k}. On the other hand,
ρ(Dck) = ¬η(Dk) = ¬
∏
Ψk =
∑
(M˘\Ψk) by Proposition 3.7, where notably M˘\Ψk ∈ ΨM .
Notably, Proposition 3.10 is concerned with η(Dk) and ρ(D
c
k) rather than η(D
c
k) and ρ(Dk) respectively required
in Pρ and Pη. It is also remarkable that based on the results of Proposition 3.10 one may further resolve a truly
feasible and realistic construction for GCL [13]. However, to recover the RSL- and FCL- nodes in terms of the general
theory of concept lattice remains the concern for the moment. Subject to this goal, it is more convenient to adopt the
irreducible expressions of Definition 2.14 to find the elements of Pρ and Pη, which is described in order.
Proposition 3.11. Subject to the formal context F (G,M) the Grsp and Gfcp can be expressed in terms of irreducible
attribute classes:
• Expressed in terms of DNF, the Grsp can be simplified (Eq. (8)) as
ρ(X) =
∑
X0⊆X
(∑
[X×0 ]F
)
=
∑
X0⊆X
∑ ⋂
X0⊂Xi⊆X
[X×0 ]F
[X×i ]F

 .
• Expressed in terms of CNF, the Gfcp can be simplified as
η(X) =
∏
X0⊇X
(∏
[X+0 ]F
)
=
∏
X0⊇X
∏ ⋂
X0⊃Xj⊇X
[X+0 ]F
[X+j ]F

 .
Proof. • Written in DNF, ρ(X) =
∑
kρ
ψkρ in which ψkρ is a product of members of M˘ and ψ
R
kρ
⊆ X since
ρ(X)R = X . Thus, ρ(X) =
∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
ϕX0) (cf. Proposition 3.6), where ϕX0 is a subset of [X0]F which
comprises only the attributes given in terms of a product of members of M˘ . For the members of ϕX0 , if
ψ0 6∈F× M∗ then there must be ψ1 ∈ ϕX0 such that ψ1 > ψ0 (ψ1+ψ0 = ψ1) and ψ1 ∈F× M
∗ (Definition 2.14).
Therefore,
∑
ϕX0 =
∑
[X×0 ]F , hence, ρ(X) =
∑
X0⊆X
(∑
[X×0 ]F
)
.
Moreover, consider a part of expression of
∑
X0⊆X
(∑
[X×0 ]F
)
which emerges as
∑
[X×1 ]F ) +
∑
[X×2 ]F with
X1 ⊂ X2. For µ ∈ [X
×
1 ]F , if µ = α ·ν with α ∈ [X
×
2 ]F or ν ∈ [X
×
2 ]F then µ is absent in
(∑
[X×1 ]F
)
+
(∑
[X×2 ]F
)
since µ+
(∑
[X×2 ]F
)
=
(∑
[X×2 ]F
)
. Consequently,
∑
X0⊆X
(∑
[X×0 ]F
)
=
∑
X0⊆X
∑(⋂
X0⊂Xi⊆X
[X×
0
]F
[X×i ]F
)
.
• By Proposition 3.7, η(X) = ¬ρ(Xc) = ¬
∑
[Xc]F =
∏(⋃
Xc
0
⊆Xc
{
µ | ¬µ = [(Xc0)
×
]F
})
. Subsequently,
¬µ = [(Xc0)
×
]F iff µ = [(X0)
+
]F by Lemma 2.15. Therefore, η(X) =
∏(⋃
X0⊇X
{
µ | µ = [(X0)
+
]F
})
=∏
X0⊇X
(∏
[X+0 ]F
)
.
Similar to the case for ρ(X), consider
∏
[X+1 ]F ·
∏
[X+2 ]F in which X1 ⊃ X2 within the expression∏
X0⊇X
(∏
[X+0 ]F
)
. For µ′ ∈ [X+1 ]F , if µ
′ = α′ + ν′ with α′ ∈ [X+2 ]F or ν
′ ∈ [X+2 ]F then µ
′ ·
(∏
[X+2 ]F
)
=(∏
[X+2 ]F
)
. Consequently,
∏
X0⊇X
(∏
[X+0 ]F
)
=
∏
X0⊇X
∏(⋂
X0⊃Xj⊇X
[X+
0
]F
[X+j ]F
)
.
Apparently, the above results are consequences of Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.12. Given a formal context F (G,M), one can obtain the contextual truth and falsity (1η and 0ρ), in
contrast to the conventional truth and falsity (1 and 0) in the following way,
• η(∅) = 0 and ρ(G) = 1,
• ρ(∅) + ρ(X) = ρ(X) and ρ(∅) · ρ(X) = ρ(∅),
η(G) · η(X) = η(X) and η(G) + η(X) = η(G), ∀X ∈ EF .
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Accordingly, 0ρ := ρ(∅) since it behaves like the falsity for Grsp, while 1η := η(G) since it behaves like the truth for
Gfcp. In addition, from Proposition 3.7, it follows that 1η = ¬0ρ. Moreover, for the truth of Grsp 1ρ ≡ 1, while
for the falsity of Gfcp 0η ≡ 0.
Proof. • η(∅) =
∏
X 6=∅ η (X) ≤
∏nF
k=1 η(Dk) = 0 by Proposition 3.8 and 3.10 since η(Dk)η(Dk′ ) = 0 for k 6= k
′.
On the other hand, ρ(G) = ¬η(∅) = ¬0 = 1 by Proposition 3.7.
• On employing Proposition 3.6,
ρ(∅) + ρ(X) =
∑
[∅]F +
∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
[X0]F ) =
∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
[X0]F ) = ρ(X),
ρ(∅) · ρ(X) =
∑
[∅]F ·
∑
X0⊆X
(
∑
[X0]F ) =
∑
[∅]F = ρ(∅),
η(G) · η(X) =
∏
[G]F ·
∏
X0⊇X
(
∏
[X0]F ) =
∏
X0⊇X
(
∏
[X0]F ) = η(X),
η(G) + η(X) =
∏
[G]F +
∏
X0⊇X
(
∏
[X0]F ) =
∏
[G]F = η(X).
Corollary 3.13. • ρ(∅) ≡ 0ρ =
∑
[∅×]F and η(G) ≡ 1η =
∏
[G+]F .
• ρ(Dk) = ρ0(Dk) + 0ρ and η(Dck) = η0(D
c
k) · 1η,
where ρ0(Dk) =
∑
[D×k ]F and η0(D
c
k) =
∏
[(Dck)
+]F for 1 ≤ k ≤ nF .
Proof. These are direct consequences of Proposition 3.12, upon using the formulae in Proposition 3.11.
• ρ(∅) =
∑
[∅]F =
∑
[∅×]F and η(G) =
∏
[G]F =
∏
[G+]F .
• ρ(Dk) =
∑
[D×k ]F +
∑
[∅×]F = ρ0(Dk) + 0ρ and η(Dck) =
∏
[(Dck)
+]F ·
∏
[G+]F = η0(D
c
k) · 1η.
Hence, one may also replace Pρ and Pη by P0ρ := {0ρ} ∪ {ρ0(Dk) | 1 ≤ k ≤ nF } and P
0
η := {1η} ∪
{η0(Dck) | 1 ≤ k ≤ nF }, respectively. Here, one may recover the full general concepts via Proposition 3.8 in terms
of the irreducible attribute classes given in Definition 2.14. According to Proposition 3.9 and based on P0ρ and
Pη, one then obtains Grsp’s in DNF and the Gfcp’s in CNF. We now proceed to consider the corresponding lattice
structure.
The ordering of general concepts can be constructed in an unambiguous way, thereby forming the desired Galois
connection.
Proposition 3.14. • For Xi, Xj ∈ EF , Xi 6= Xj iff ρ(Xi) 6= ρ(Xj) and η(Xi) 6= η(Xj).
• For Xi, Xj ∈ EF , Xi ⊂ Xj iff ρ(Xi) < ρ(Xj) and η(Xi) < η(Xj).
Proof. • By Lemma 2.10, ∀µi∀µj µRi 6= µ
R
j =⇒ µi 6= µj . Here, Xi 6= Xj means
{
ρ(Xi)
R 6=ρ(Xj)
R
η(Xi)
R 6=η(Xj)
R , which
implies
{
ρ(Xi) 6=ρ(Xj)
η(Xi) 6=η(Xj)
. Thus, Xi 6= Xj =⇒
{
ρ(Xi) 6=ρ(Xj)
η(Xi) 6=η(Xj)
. On the other hand, if Xi = Xj then
{
ρ(Xi)=ρ(Xj)
η(Xi)=η(Xj)
.
Consequently, if ρ(Xi) 6= ρ(Xj) or η(Xi) 6= η(Xj) then Xi 6= Xj , i.e.,
{
ρ(Xi) 6=ρ(Xj) =⇒ Xi 6=Xj
η(Xi) 6=η(Xj) =⇒ Xi 6=Xj
. Moreover,
ρ(Xi) 6= ρ(Xj) =⇒ Xi 6= Xj =⇒
{
ρ(Xi) 6=ρ(Xj)
η(Xi) 6=η(Xj)
and η(Xi) 6= η(Xj) =⇒ Xi 6= Xj =⇒
{
ρ(Xi) 6=ρ(Xj)
η(Xi) 6=η(Xj)
.
Therefore, Xi 6= Xj ⇐⇒
{
ρ(Xi) 6=ρ(Xj)
η(Xi) 6=η(Xj)
.
• With Definition 3.3, one has the ordering rules
Xi ⊆ Xj ⇐⇒ (Xj)I
∗
⊆ (Xi)I
∗
and Xi ⊆ Xj ⇐⇒ (Xi)
∗
⊆ (Xj)
∗
,
which is the consequence of Eq. (5) extended to F ∗(G,M∗). Therefore,
Xi ⊂ Xj ⇐⇒ (Xj)
I∗ ⊂ (Xi)
I∗ ⇐⇒ η(Xi) ≡
∏
(Xi)
I∗ <
∏
(Xj)
I∗ ≡ η(Xj),
Xi ⊂ Xj ⇐⇒ (Xi)
∗ ⊂ (Xj)
∗ ⇐⇒ ρ(Xi) ≡
∑
(Xi)
∗ <
∑
(Xj)
∗ ≡ ρ(Xj),
by Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.15. The conventional FCL and RSL nodes can always be recovered from the GCL:
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• The criterion for X being an RSL extent, which is Y ♦rsl = X by Yrsl := X
, can be satisfied with
X ∈
{⋃
m∈M0
mR |M0 ⊆M
}
.
The criterion for X being an FCL extent, which is Y Ifcl = X by Yfcl := X
I , can be satisfied with
X ∈
{⋂
m∈M0
mR |M0 ⊆M
}
.
• Whenever X ∈ EF is an FCL and/or RSL extent,
the corresponding RSL intent Yrsl can be faithfully read out from ρ(X),
the corresponding FCL intent Yfcl can be faithfully read out from η(X).
Proof. • The criteria for X being the extent can be rearranged by means of Eq. (9).
For Yrsl = X
, it turns out that
(
X
)♦
≡
⋃
m∈Xm
R = X . Note that ∀M0 ⊆ M if X =
⋃
m∈M0
mR then
X = M0, thus,
⋃
m∈X m
R =
⋃
m∈M0
mR ≡ X . Therefore,
(
X
)♦
= X for X ∈
{⋃
m∈M0
mR |M0 ⊆M
}
.
On the other hand, for Yfcl = X
I , one requires that
(
XI
)I
≡
⋂
m∈XI m
R = X . Likewise, if X =
⋂
m∈M0
mR
then M0, thus,
⋂
m∈XI m
R =
⋂
m∈M0
mR ≡ X . Consequently,
(
XI
)I
= X for X ∈
{⋂
m∈M0
mR |M0 ⊆M
}
.
• By Proposition 3.11,
ρ(X) =
∑
X0⊆X
∑ ⋂
X0⊂Xi⊆X
[X×0 ]F
[X×i ]F

 =∑

 ⋃
X0⊆X

 ⋂
X0⊂Xi⊆X
[X×0 ]F
[X×i ]F



 ,
where
⋃
X0⊆X
(⋂
X0⊂Xi⊆X
[X×
0
]F
[X×i ]F
)
⊃
⋃
X0⊆X
{
m ∈M | mR = X0
}
according to Lemma 2.15. Moreover,⋃
X0⊆X
{
m ∈M | mR = X0
}
=
{
m ∈M | mR ⊆ X
}
= X by Eq. (9). Therefore, if m ∈ X ≡ Yrsl then
m ∈
⋃
X0⊆X
(⋂
X0⊂Xi⊆X
[X×
0
]F
[X×i ]F
)
. Similarly,
η(X) =
∏ ⋃
X0⊇X

 ⋂
X0⊃Xj⊇X
[X+0 ]F
[X+j ]F



 ,
where
⋃
X0⊇X
(⋂
X0⊃Xj⊇X
[X+
0
]F
[X+j ]F
)
⊃
{
m ∈M | mR ⊇ X
}
= XI by Lemma 2.15 and Eq. (9). Therefore, if
m ∈ XI ≡ Yfcl then m ∈
⋃
X0⊇X
(⋂
X0⊃Xj⊇X
[X+
0
]F
[X+j ]F
)
.
Remarkably, the roles the RSL and FCL play within the GCL can be understood easily. The components of an
RSL intent are those simple attributes (Definition 2.5) found from the Grsp in DNF, whereas the components of
an FCL intent are simple attributes found from Gfcp in CNF. Moreover, the RSL is only able to categorise those
object classes which are expressible in terms of a union of mR’s for some m’s in M , whereas the FCL is only able to
categorise those object classes which are expressible in terms of an intersection of mR’s for some m’s in M .
One may construct the GCL in terms of lattice theory [1, 10, 12].
Proposition 3.16. Based on the collection of all the general concepts LF = {(X, ρ(X), η(X)) | X ∈ EF }, the GCL
exhibits a lattice structure ΓF := (LF ,∧,∨, †), where ∧ (meet) and ∨ (join) are binary operators and the unary
operator † provides a kind of duality:
• LF defines the partially ordered set (poset) (LF ,≤) with the unambiguous order ≤.
• The lattice operations ∧, ∨ and † are well defined.
ΓF is self-dual in the sense that l ∈ LF iff l† ∈ LF . † reverses the ordering of lattice nodes in the sense that
li ≤ lj iff l
†
i ≥ l
†
j .
• ΓF is complete in the sense that the supremum and infimum are found to be lsup = (G,1, 1η) and linf = (∅, 0ρ,0),
respectively, where G is the full collection of objects.
Proof. For all lk ∈ LF , let lk = (Xk, ρ(Xk), η(Xk)).
• Because Xi ⊆ Xj iff
{
ρ(Xi)≤ρ(Xj)
η(Xi)≤η(Xj)
(Proposition 3.14), it is natural to define li ≤ lj via
{
Xi⊆Xj
ρ(Xi)≤ρ(Xj)
η(Xi)≤η(Xj)
.
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• ∀li∀lj∀lk ∈ LF , one has
li ∧ lj := (Xi ∩Xj , ρ(Xi ∩Xj), η(Xi ∩Xj)) ∈ LF since Xi ∩Xj ∈ EF ,
li ∨ lj := (Xi ∪Xj , ρ(Xi ∪Xj), η(Xi ∪Xj)) ∈ LF since Xi ∪Xj ∈ EF ,
l
†
k := (X
c
k, ρ(X
c
k), η(X
c
k)) ≡ (X
c
k,¬η(Xk),¬ρ(Xk)) since X
c
k ∈ EF ,
where (Xck, ρ(X
c
k), η(X
c
k)) = (X
c
k,¬η(Xk),¬ρ(Xk)) is based on Proposition 3.7.
Moreover, li ≤ lj iff l
†
i ≥ l
†
j as
{
Xi⊆Xj
ρ(Xi)≤ρ(Xj)
η(Xi)≤η(Xj)
⇐⇒
{
Xci⊇X
c
j
ρ(Xci )≥ρ(X
c
j )
η(Xci )≥η(X
c
j )
or
{
Xci⊇X
c
j
¬ρ(Xi)≥¬ρ(Xj)
¬η(Xi)≥¬η(Xj)
.
• Given L0 ⊆ LF , let l0 = (X0, ρ(X0), η(X0)) ∈ L0 in which X0 ∈ E0 ⊆ EF . Then,
∨
l0∈L0
l0 =
( ⋃
X0∈E0
X0, ρ
( ⋃
X0∈E0
X0
)
, η
( ⋃
X0∈E0
X0
))
∈ LF ,
∧
l0∈L0
l0 =
( ⋂
X0∈E0
X0, ρ
( ⋂
X0∈E0
X0
)
, η
( ⋂
X0∈E0
X0
))
∈ LF .
Since
∨
l0∈L0
l0 ≥ l ≥
∧
l0∈L0
l0 ∀l ∈ L0, it turns out that
lsup =
∨
l0∈LF
l0 = (G,1, η(G)) ≡ (G,1, 1η)
linf =
∧
l0∈LF
l0 = (∅, ρ(∅),0) ≡ (∅, 0ρ,0)
by Proposition 3.8, 3.12.
It is also noteworthy that within the expression (X, ρ(X), η(X)) one may regard (ρ(X), η(X)) as a prescription
for the general intent corresponding to the general extent X . Such a prescription is convenient for the discussion
concerning the RSL and FCL in relation to the GCL.
4. DISCUSSION
One has proved the existence of the general concept lattice above the conventional framework of RSL and FCL,
following the anticipated accomplishments G1-G5 proposed in Sec. 1. The formal context F (G,M) automatically
induces the extended formal context F ∗(G,M∗) (Lemma 2.8). In effect, based on F (G,M) there are intrinsic
relations between the objects in G and the members of the full generalised attribute set M∗, which all pertain to
the indispensable structure of the content information. It is by virtue of F ∗(G,M∗) that one can assure the 2-tuple
general concept expression in terms of (general extent, general intent) for G1, where the general extents emerge as
the object classes allowable within GCL and the general intents their corresponding property descriptions. From
Proposition 3.4 and 3.6 one notices that the general intent can be represented by the pair [18]
(generalised rough set property, generalised formal concept property) , i.e. (Grsp,Gfcp).
Moreover, the general extents are found to be the collection EF = σ({mR | m ∈M}) in view of Proposition 3.5 and
Proposition 3.6, where in particular X ∈ EF iff X
c ∈ EF . Note that G3 is achieved as follows. Since EF in effect
comprises whatever distinctive object classes, making theGCL constitute a Hasse diagram with 2|σ(G/R)| = 2nF nodes
(G2), it is certain on the GCL that one can always find all the nodes corresponding to the object classes categorised
according to the RSL and the FCL, respectively. Indeed, Proposition 3.15 also provides systematic ways to regain
both the RSL intent and FCL intent from the irreducible expressions of Grsp and Gfcp, respectively. Another point
is that the GCL permits deterministic construction (G4), as is the method proposed by Lemma 3.8, 3.11 and
Corollary 3.13. Though to complete the general concept construction in such a manner turns out to be inefficient,
the method is rather elucidative for the GCL in relation to the conventional lattices. Especially, one may notice that
the freedom involved in the formal context can be significantly reduced. The GCL in fact emerges as a self-dual
lattice bearing the structure of Proposition 3.16 based on the one-to-one correspondence ∀X ∈ EF
{
ρ(Xc)=¬η(X)
η(Xc)=¬ρ(X)
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demonstrated in Lemma 3.7, which is the conjugateness relation needed by G5. Obviously, the self-duality halves
the complexity for completing the general intents.
Being an original construction, the present approach of GCL has thus far focused on its comparabibility with
the existing approaches. To this end, one found the employment of Grsp in DNF and Gfcp in CNF particularly
instructive for carrying out such comparisons.
• ρ(X) and η(X) can be regarded respectively as the generalisation for RSL intent and the generalisation for FCL
intent (Proposition 3.1, 3.4):
Without altering its theoretical content, one may replace the RSL intent X by its disjunction
∑
X while
ρ(X) =
∑
X
∗
, which can be intuitively arranged into an expression in DNF.
The FCL intent XI can be represented by its conjunction
∏
XI while η(X) =
∏
XI
∗
, which can be arranged
into an expression in CNF.
• One has acquired more precise descriptions for the properties of the object class through ρ(X) and η(X) than
through the RSL intent and FCL intent:
Observe that ρ(X) =
∑
X
∗
=
∑
X + (. . .) ≥
∑
X since obviously X
∗
⊇ X. If X is an RSL extent,
ρ(X) suggests that there are in fact more properties peculiar to the class X to be considered, in contrast to∑
X.
Likewise, η(X) =
∏
XI
∗
· (. . .) ≤
∏
XI (∵ XI
∗
⊇ XI). Namely, if X is an FCL extent then η(X), in contrast
to
∏
XI , in fact incorporates more properties the objects in the class X can possess in common.
Technically, the general concept construction reflecting the above conventional wisdom of the traditional FCL and
RSL can be accomplished via Lemma 3.8, 3.11 and Corollary 3.13, which requires the determination of various
irreducible attributes (Definition 2.14). Unfortunately, such a method remains tedious and impractical even though
the irreducible attributes are constructable. However, things turn out drastically different when one instead considers
the Gfcp in DNF and the Grsp in CNF. In Ref. [13] it will be shown that the Gfcp can be identified as components of
the contextual truth 1η and ρ(X) the contextual falsity 0ρ defined in Proposition 3.12. Moreover, the determination
of the general intents can be implemented by binary representations which label the object classes. Noteworthy is
also that the contextual truth (or falsity) also plays the crucial role for the logical deduction in the frame of classical
logics. In practice, all the rules of implication concerned with the attributes will be shown to be derivable based on
µ→ µ · 1η ∀µ (or, equivalently, from µ+0ρ → µ). We shall present the tractability in both obtaining the full general
concepts and determining all the accompanied rules of logic deduction for the general concept lattice in the next paper
[13].
In conclusion, the GCL provides the comprehensive categorisation for whatever distinctive objects according to
whatever properties one can refer to in the formal context. The general extents are collected as EF =
{
µR | µ ∈M∗
}
as opposed to Proposition 3.15, which states [19] that
ErslF =
{ ⋃
m∈M0
mR |M0 ⊆M
}
, E
fcl
F =
{ ⋂
m∈M0
mR |M0 ⊆M
}
.
Clearly, ErslF ∪ E
fcl
F ⊂ EF EF is also referred to as
{⋃
D∈E0 D | E
0 ⊆ G/R
}
(Proposition 3.5), meaning that the
categorisation the GCL can accomplish ranges over all the subsets of G that are distinct from the perspective of
formal context. It is also remarkable that the general intent is more adequately represented by the equivalent class of
attributes [X ]F =
{
µ | µR = X, µ ∈M∗
}
meaning that [X ]F refers to all the attributes the objects in X possess in
common. Here, η(X) and ρ(X) simply appear as the bounds of [X ]F . It can be further shown [13] that every general
intent is distinctive in the sense that [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅ iff Xi 6= Xj and M∗ =
⋃
X∈EF
[X ]F . Thus, the GCL not only
provides the categorisation for all the discernible subsets of G but also exhausts the full generalised attribute set M∗.
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